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EDITORIAL
Introduction to the Issue  
Policy Recommendations for Corporate Social Responsibility  
for Arctic Petroleum
Ilan Kelman, UCL, London and NUPI, Oslo.
Julia S.P. Loe, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Oslo.
Emma Wilson, ECW Energy, London.
Elana Wilson Rowe, NUPI, Oslo.
Nina Poussenkova, Sampo, Moscow.
Elena Nikitina, Sampo, Moscow.
Daniel Fjærtoft, Sigra Group.
Players involved in petroleum exploration and extrac-tion frequently propose corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR), while those who oppose such activities 
critique CSR with equal vigor. A common understand-
ing of CSR’s theoretical and practical meanings rarely 
exists—and perhaps could not and should not exist. 
Using Arctic petroleum in Norway and Russia, the 
research reported in this issue identifies and analyzes 
similarities and differences in CSR perspectives and 
perceptions.
The articles included here cover the field work in 
four case studies where semi-structured interviews were 
conducted: Hammerfest, Murmansk, Komi Republic, 
and Nenets Autonomous Okrug (NAO). Interviewees 
included the local population, regional and local author-
ities, NGOs, and petroleum company representatives. 
Additionally, an input-output model of economic anal-
ysis was developed to determine how much petroleum 
contributes to the economy in the Komi Republic. The 
results were compared with Norway in order to investi-
gate the petroleum industry’s capacity to drive regional 
growth in Russia and Norway.
The field work and economic analyses reported in 
the other articles provide the basis for a set of policy les-
sons which are summarized here. These lessons apply to 
all players involved in petroleum-related CSR, includ-
ing companies, governments, non-governmental orga-
nizations, and citizens—whether inside or outside the 
communities involved.
A first step is to ensure that definitions used for 
CSR and related terms are clear. Mismatches can occur 
through both language and culture. With regard to lan-
guage, the phrase CSR emerges from English and gener-
ally from a Western, academic context. While the phrase 
is translated into, and used in, other languages, includ-
ing Norwegian and Russian, the understanding is not 
as straightforward as in English.
Culturally, even when speaking the same lan-
guage and using the same words, different meanings 
emerge. Interpretations of CSR can range from support-
ing a company’s employees to being environmentally 
friendly to providing sports and entertainment facilities 
for the entire community. Understandings frequently 
differ regarding how to consult a community and what 
to do with the consultation results.
If CSR is about working with people and communi-
ties to determine and respond to their needs, then con-
sultation can be particularly tricky. No community is 
homogenous and many researchers and policy makers 
even suggest that the concept of “community” is too 
abstract and nebulous to be of practical use. Individu-
als differ, meaning that their needs, interests, and modes 
of expression differ.
Dealing with only leaders, elected or otherwise, can-
not suffice to understand any group of people. Often, 
those making the decisions or negotiating on behalf of 
the “community” regarding collaboration with petro-
leum companies reap the most benefits, but they are not 
the ones most negatively affected by the consequences 
of the decisions or by the petroleum-related activities.
One overall lesson from the case studies is that divi-
sions identified amongst views in the community did 
not follow stereotypical lines. Splits were not observed 
along for-profit/NGO or indigenous/non-indigenous 
lines. Instead, at community and individual levels, those 
inside the sector tended to be more positive about petro-
leum-related CSR than those outside the sector.
At times, being an “insider” meant being closer to 
the center of wealth and farther from the industrial sites, 
rather than necessarily working for the sector. But where 
personal benefits were perceived to emerge from petro-
leum, especially related to CSR (or simply standard com-
pany operations), then people tended to be more favor-
able towards petroleum exploration and extraction.
Consequently, to understand local contexts and dif-
ferences amongst and within groups, people need to be 
consulted and engaged on their own territory in their 
own ways. Holding an open meeting in the capital is 
useful, but is only a partial step. Not everyone has the 
time or ability to attend—nor might everyone wish to 
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be publicly open about their questions and concerns. 
Community consultation also means heading out into 
the villages and countryside to see how people live, what 
they need, and what they can contribute; learning from 
them on their own terms. A “one size fits all” approach 
to consulting about CSR, or for implementing CSR, 
cannot give a full or accurate picture.
Instead, CSR should not stand isolated from other 
livelihoods and development activities. The social and 
political contexts in which a company operates, and the 
varying contexts for different community sectors, need 
to be understood by governments, companies, and non-
governmental organizations. CSR goals would need to 
be lucidly strategized, articulated, and communicated 
as part of a conversation and dialogue, not as a one-way 
provision of information to those who turn up. Listen-
ing and responding is as important as presenting and 
responding.
This situation does not mean that all individuals and 
community sectors are entirely correct in their views or 
must be completely obeyed. In the same way that self-
critique and self-reflection should be part of conduct-
ing CSR, critiquing and reflecting on what people in 
the community divulge are important activities. Percep-
tions can diverge due to differential access to different 
information—as well as due to varying impacts of petro-
leum-related work. People have personal and collective 
agendas which they have a right and duty to promote.
No knowledge form or source is a panacea. No single 
individual or entity necessarily has all the right answers. 
Working with communities regarding petroleum-related 
CSR means creating a partnership, seeking a represen-
tative sample for consultation, and being flexible about 
the meanings and practicalities of CSR.
ANALYSIS
Petroleum CSR in Russia: Affordable Luxury or Basic Necessity?
By Nina Poussenkova and Elena Nikitina, Moscow
Abstract:
Petroleum CSR in Russia is particularly important in remote Northern regions with harsh climate, and it 
has specific national characteristics that result from historic, economic, political and psychological factors. 
Soviet social responsibility in the oil and gas industry was born in West Siberia where major oil fields were 
discovered in the 1960s, and tens of thousands of workers from the “mainland” arrived in a sparsely-inhab-
ited land with adverse natural conditions. Siberian oil production associations had to become the “found-
ing fathers” of oil towns and ensure acceptable living standards for their employees, so that they would meet 
challenging crude production plans. This all-encompassing social responsibility was the consequence of mis-
management and dysfunctions within the Soviet system, a low level of automation and poor productivity 
in the oil industry, and the harsh climate of West Siberia. During the 1990s, most vertically-integrated oil 
companies divested their non-core social assets, passing them to municipalities, and their social responsi-
bility began to resemble the CSR of International Oil Companies. Now, all Russian petroleum companies 
proclaim firm commitment to CSR in accordance with globally-recognized principles. However, a survey 
of CSR perceptions among MBA students from the main oil and gas companies show that their views are 
a combination of the Soviet legacy, recollections of the roaring 1990s, the current situational context, and 
Western attitudes that were transplanted into Russia.
Understanding Expectations
With the oil and gas industry of Russia moving fur-
ther North and East, to uninhabited regions with 
harsh climate, “petroleum” corporate social responsi-
bility is becoming increasingly important. In general, 
the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
remains rather vague, and views on its essence range 
from “A company’s business is business” of Milton Fried-
man to “Doing well by doing good” ascribed to Ben-
jamin Franklin. CSR perceptions across countries are 
largely determined by national context—history, tra-
ditions, socio-economic development, and even public 
mentality. Also, different companies focus on different 
aspects of CSR in their sustainability strategies.
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Therefore, the project “Sustainability and petroleum 
extraction: Corporate and community perspectives in 
Northern Norway and the Russian Arctic” can add real 
value, since it is important for foreign petroleum com-
panies, including the Norwegian Statoil, to understand 
what the Russian authorities and population expect from 
them in terms of social and environmental actions. In 
their turn, Russian companies, such as Rosneft and 
LUKOIL which are expanding their presence in Norway, 
should be aware of the Norwegian perceptions of CSR.
Past Realities
Interestingly, some respondents to our surveys spoke nos-
talgically about “Soviet social responsibility”. To under-
stand this phenomenon, one should recall the history 
of the Soviet oil industry. It was born before the 1917 
revolution in Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus: ter-
ritories with mild climate and relatively well-developed 
social infrastructure. After WWII, the activities moved 
to the Volga-Urals region, where living conditions were 
quite adequate and the economy was reasonably well-
diversified, so there was no particular need for a special 
“petroleum” social responsibility.
But then, in the early 1960s, the industry shifted 
to West Siberia, where huge oil fields were discovered. 
It is a sparsely-populated region with extremely severe 
climate (temperatures range from -50˚C in winter to 
+40˚C in summer), covered with swamps, and plagued 
by myriad mosquitoes. Overnight, tens of thousands of 
workers “from the mainland” arrived to prospect and 
produce the “black gold” in an area with no roads and 
just a few wooden houses, in typical Soviet gross mis-
management and disregard for people.
As Thane Gustafson has pointed out, energy deci-
sion-making in the USSR was unbalanced. “Hydro-
carbons have been excessively favored over coal and 
nuclear power, Tyumen’s province over the rest of Sibe-
ria, development over exploration, field operations over 
industrial support, short-term output over sound infra-
structural development (such as housing and roads), 
and autarky over interdependence—in short, there has 
been a chronic favoring of the near-term over the long, 
the safe over the risky, and narrow objectives over the 
broad ones”1.
Thus, in 1964, Surgut, a town with the population 
of 5,000 people, had only seven enterprises. By 1965, 
there were over 60 new enterprises, and their employ-
ees had to be somehow housed and fed2. The regional 
1 Thane Gustafson. Crisis Amid Plenty, Princeton University Press, 
1989, pp. 58–59.
2 Oil Epopee of West Siberia. Ed. By M.Krol, Moscow, Publish-
ing House Neftyannik, 1995, p. 33.
party committee tried to cope with these problems, but 
its capacities were simply not enough. So, oil production 
associations (PA) came to the rescue—they needed capa-
ble workers to fulfill challenging oil production plans.
Moscow planners pushed the oil ministry toward 
inexorably higher output levels, and they were not partic-
ularly concerned how the West Siberian oilmen reached 
the targets. Given insufficient automation and poor labor 
productivity, Siberian PAs had to attract large quanti-
ties of manpower. Consequently, the oil and gas min-
istry used two methods: either housing workers in per-
manent base towns in the region and sending them on 
temporary duty to the fields or flying in workers from 
outside Siberia on a two-week rotation. However, the 
fly-in system was hard on the oilmen and detrimental 
for efficiency.
Many new arrivals were lured to West Siberia by 
money and/or the chance for career advancement. 
Indeed, oilmen’s salaries were adjusted by a  regional 
coefficient of 1.7, and the so-called Northern coefficient.
But financial incentives alone were not enough to 
make oilmen stay in West Siberia. The main reasons for 
high personnel turnover were bad living conditions: ini-
tially, workers often lived in tents in winter where water 
froze in glasses. So, oil PAs had to rapidly erect wooden 
barracks or convert storage facilities… Interestingly, geo-
physicists, rather than construction workers, built the 
first two panel 5-storey houses in Surgut in 1965–1966.
In addition to housing, oilmen had to build cinemas 
and recreation centers because the young workers had 
nothing to do in their free time and soon conflicts began 
in West Siberia. In 1967, Glavtyumenneftegas began 
to construct two major rest and recreation centers for 
Siberian oilmen in the Tuapse region on the Black Sea.
Lev Tchurilov, the last USSR Minister of the Oil 
and Gas Industry, describes how social problems were 
resolved at the start of oil production in West Siberia 
in his book “Lifeblood of Empire. A Personal History 
of the Rise and Fall of the Soviet Oil Industry”3. When 
he was appointed director of the Nefteyugansk Oil Pro-
duction Unit, there was only one small bakery (built 
by geologists) in the town of Nefteyugansk. However, 
its capacity was absolutely insufficient for the rapidly 
growing population of oilmen. They ordered a couple 
of mobile military ovens that were regularly breaking 
down. One unlucky day both of them broke down, and 
the town was left without bread. Oilmen began to hur-
riedly build a new powerful bakery for their own needs—
and meanwhile bread was flown to the town from Sur-
gut, Nizhnevartovsk and Khanty-Mansiisk.
3 Lev Tchourilov with Isabel Gorst and Nina Poussenkova. PIW 
Publications, 1996.
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Moreover, given the total shortage of consumer goods 
in the USSR, the simplest task turned into a “mission 
impossible”, and oilmen relied only on their ingenuity. 
Lev Tchourilov recalls that TV antennas were installed 
in Surgut in 1967, but Nefteyugansk was located too 
far away, and the quality of TV transmission left much 
to be desired. Armed with a sack of delicious Siberian 
smoked fish, oilmen went to Riga where a major elec-
tronic plant was based. There, fish was swapped for 
a powerful antenna that they installed on an old drill-
ing rig—and the TV began to function properly in 
Nefteyugansk.
In December 1969, the decree of the CPSU Central 
Committee and the Council of Ministers “On Measures 
Aimed at Accelerated Development of the Oil Industry 
in West Siberia” was adopted. It envisaged, among other 
things, large-scale construction of the oil towns. But even 
15 years later, in 1985, the availability of housing in the West 
Siberian petroleum sector was just 66% of the Russian aver-
age. The availability of schools was 79%, child-care facil-
ities—44%, hospitals and policlinics—55% of the norm4.
Yet, if state-of-the-art technologies were used and 
labor productivity improved, the number of workers in 
the Siberian oil industry could be reduced, as well as 
the resulting social expenditures. Instead, the oil sec-
tor was forced to build permanent towns in the extreme 
North. These settlements grew far faster than planned, 
as new workers were brought in to compensate for short-
fall in other inputs. In the early 1980s the population 
of the Tyumen province grew twice as fast as projected: 
the net increase was nearly 750,000 people, instead of 
the 370,000 originally planned. Much of the housing 
problem, therefore, was a symptom rather than a cause5.
Therefore, oil companies had to maintain non-core 
social assets (schools, bath-houses, cow-breeding farms, 
etc.): everything they needed to make life reasonably 
adequate for their workers. These non-core social activ-
ities took up much of their time and energy, sometimes 
interfering with their key job.
Thus, the 1985 oil production plan was fulfilled only 
by 94%, and the shortfall was mainly in West Siberia. 
The CPSU and the relevant ministries identified the prin-
ciple reasons of this failure as follows: insufficient focus 
on supplying workers with housing and social and cul-
tural infrastructure, low rates of new field development, 
shortage of modern equipment, etc6.
Therefore, the much admired Soviet “petroleum” 
social responsibility resulted from a number of factors: 
4 Oil Epopee of West Siberia, p.277.
5 Thane Gustafson, p. 116.
6 Vagit Alekperov, Oil of Russia: Past, Present and Future, Mos-
cow, Creative Economy, 2011, pp. 333–334.
the harsh West-Siberian climate; mismanagement and 
dysfunction in organization of oil production; low labor 
productivity and insufficient level of mechanization. 
And heads of oil PAs had to heroically cope with adverse 
natural conditions, challenging crude production plans, 
pressure and interference from Moscow, and, in addition, 
had to be “founding fathers” of oil towns. Regrettably, 
the petrodollars that the USSR earned from exports of 
hydrocarbons produced with such hardships were not 
used to raise the living standards of the people.
During the 1990s, when market reforms began 
in Russia, and PAs were corporatized and privatized, 
transforming into vertically-integrated oil companies, 
many of them divested of their social assets in order to 
raise operating efficiency and transferred them to the 
local municipalities. Still, it remains an open question 
whether their efficiency improved due to this divestment, 
and whether the quality of social services provided by 
the municipalities to the residents remained adequate.
In general, the 1990s were the period of economic, 
social and political upheavals in Russia, low oil prices, 
crude production decline, galloping inflation and ram-
pant non-payments. Oil companies were forced to reduce 
investments, shut down wells and delay payment of sala-
ries. In response, oilmen went on strike under a popular 
slogan “Hungry oilman—a shame to Russia”. In Autumn 
1993 a strike of some 7,000 oilmen began because they 
had not received salaries for over six months7. Clearly, 
CSR issues were not the top priority in such conditions.
However, even in these troubled days, some oil com-
panies were globalizing, hiring foreign advisors, estab-
lishing alliances with international partners, entering 
world capital markets, and learning the internationally-
accepted rules of the game, including in the CSR sphere.
Present Myths
In the 2000s, life in Russia was stabilizing, oil prices 
were rising, crude production was increasing, and CSR 
and sustainability became an affordable luxury. Two new 
petroleum provinces were launched—Timano-Pechora 
and East Siberia—but they are much smaller than West 
Siberia, and require considerably less “imported” man-
power. Oil companies now do not have to provide such 
comprehensive social packages to their employees as they 
did in the Soviet past, but their policy now embraces 
new stakeholders, e.g. indigenous people. So their “sot-
sialnaya otvetstvennost” became closer to the CSR prac-
ticed by their Western counterparts.
All petroleum companies in Russia proclaim their 
firm commitment to CSR issues. Rosneft, for example, 
says that it “adheres to the policy of high social respon-
7 Kommersant, 25.11.1993.
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sibility towards its employees, their family members, 
population of the regions where it operates, and soci-
ety as a whole… the company is interested in having its 
employees and their families living in modern comfort-
able towns and settlements, them being provided with 
adequate communal services, proper medical treatment, 
opportunities for sports activities, interesting recreation, 
good schools for their children. It is particularly impor-
tant in remote regions with extreme climate”8. Rosneft 
publishes annual glossy sustainability reports with due 
account for requirements of the Global Reporting Ini-
tiative: international influence is quite strong in Ros-
neft (four out of nine directors are foreigners, as well as 
three out of eleven members of the Managing Board).
However, presumably PR professionals write these 
reports. Meanwhile, it is important to understand what 
the average employees of petroleum companies, who 
work in the fields and actually implement the CSR policy, 
think about it. We compiled a questionnaire on elements 
of CSR, and intentionally introduced several positions 
that, presumably, do not constitute CSR as such, but can 
be classified as “good management practices”. We made 
a survey among 5 MBA groups (total of 73 students) dur-
ing our lectures at the Gubkin Oil and Gas Academy, 
MGIMO and the Institute of Oil and Gas Business. Stu-
dents were asked to fill in the questionnaire (they could 
tick off more than one box) and provide their own defi-
nition of CSR. Since the respondents were well-educated 
mid-level managers, from Gazprom, Rosneft, LUKOIL, 
Surgutneftegas, Gazpromneft, Tatneft, Transneft, and 
service companies, they were an ideal sample.
Their answers concerning elements of CSR provided 
certain surprises. Two most popular answers, probably, 
can be termed as “good management practices”, rather 
than CSR per se. No less surprisingly, support of sports 
in the regions of the company operations was only mar-
ginally less popular than environmentally sound activ-
ities (despite the claim of all petroleum companies that 
environment protection is their top priority).
Another surprise was that climate change impacts, 
a hot subject in governmental policy and public debate 
(and PR publications of Russian companies), was one 
of the least popular answers, in stark contrast to inter-
national practices (see Table 1 on p. 7).
Definitions of CSR given by the MBA students were 
rather general. Still, some answers indicate that the Rus-
sian oilmen believe in “doing well by doing good”. They 
state that CSR means “Increasing the company’s com-
petitiveness by being a socially responsible citizen” and 
that “A profitable and successful company can afford to 
take care of people and the environment”.
However, some definitions are very indicative of the 
Russian specifics. Many students said that “Actually, 
practically all the elements outlined in the question-
naire are envisaged by the effective federal and regional 
legislation. So, CSR means a  strict adherence to the 
law”. Other respondents commented that the extent of 
CSR activities was determined by the licensing agree-
ment between the company and the authorities. How-
ever, Western companies in their CSR efforts voluntarily 
go beyond what is prescribed by the effective legislation. 
Besides, the strictness of Russian laws is compensated 
by the fact that it is not necessary to fully observe them.
Another popular answer was: “Honestly paying taxes 
so that the regional and local authorities can take care 
of the local population”. While in the OECD countries 
honest payment of taxes is an indisputable legal and 
moral obligation of companies, this answer, actually, is 
the legacy of the “roaring 1990s”, when tax evasion was 
modus operandi for many Russian businesses. Moreover, 
today it is not guaranteed that tax revenues generated 
by the oil and gas business will be used to improve liv-
ing standards in the petroleum provinces.
One student made a bitter reference to the 1990s: 
“I think that this sphere should be regulated by the state. 
This “responsibility” as such under private ownership 
does not exist! The events of the 1990s in our country 
confirmed this”.
Some oilmen said rather cynically that CSR was 
actually a PR effort aimed at improving the image of 
the company, and CSR activities meant behaving in 
a way that does not irritate unnecessarily the local peo-
ple. “Implementing a sound social and environmental 
policy in order to improve the image of the company 
and avoid social conflicts in the region of its operations”.
Some students stressed that the company should take 
care of the most pressing needs of the local people (neces-
sities rather than luxuries); even specifically emphasizing 
that CSR does not mean buying football teams.
Thus, it seems that the CSR perceptions of the con-
temporary Russian oilmen are in fact an uneasy mix of 
the Soviet legacy, recollections of the roaring 1990s, the 
current situational context, and Western attitudes that 
were transplanted into Russia.
About the Authors
Nina Poussenkova and Elena Nikitina are researchers at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations 
(IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow.
8 <http://www.rosneft.ru/Development/social/>
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Table 1: What Elements Does CSR Include?
Element Number of 
answers
Protecting health of the company’s employees 61
Training and development of the company’s employees 59
Promoting job creation and small business development in the regions of operations 58
Environmentally sound activities 57
Support of sports in the regions of operations 56
Protecting health of the local population in the regions of operations 51
Ensuring occupational safety of the company’s employees 48
Training of the company’s employees in the sphere of environmental safety and social 
responsibility
48
Regular dialogue with the local population on social and environmental issues 48
Support of education and development of skills of the local population in the regions of 
operations
46
Support of arts and culture in the regions of operations 44
Contribution to the development and upgrading of public utilities and social infrastructure in 
the regions of operations
44
Assistance to the local population in the events of natural and technogenic disasters 44
Support of R&D institutes 43
Clean-up of past environmental damage inflicted by the company 37
Protection of historic heritage and culture of indigenous population in the regions of 
operations
31
Business transparency and accountability 30
Compensation of the local population for the negative impact of production activities 30
Respect of indigenous population’s land rights 30
Ethical conduct of business 26
Support of sports in the whole country 26
Support of health protection sphere in the whole country 25
Support of education in the whole country 25
Support of arts and culture in the whole country 21
Clean-up of past environmental damage inflicted by other players 20
Activities aimed at climate change prevention/adaptation 19
Involving stakeholders in decision-making on production issues 10
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ANALYSIS
Perceptions of Petroleum-Related CSR in the Russian Arctic
By Julia S. P. Loe and Elana Wilson Rowe, Oslo
Abstract:
There is an increasing tendency to consider social and commercial issues at the circumpolar level, including 
creating contact networks, exchanging experience and enhancing the role of business in circumpolar regional 
cooperation. This brief article speaks to this growing trend in Arctic business cooperation by bringing to 
light both commonality and variation in society-business relations in the Russian Arctic. Drawing upon 56 
in-depth qualitative interviews, we examine and compare how petroleum-related corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR) was understood in Murmansk Oblast' (with its shelved Shtokman project) and Nenets Auton-
omous Okrug (with its decades-long experience with petroleum projects).
Introduction
There is an increasing tendency to consider social and 
commercial issues at the circumpolar level, including 
creating contact networks, exchanging experience and 
enhancing the role of business in circumpolar regional 
cooperation. The establishment of the Arctic Economic 
Council—an arms-length body established by the Arctic 
Council—is one such recent example. However, while 
the Arctic region is an interlinked ecosystem and bears 
the impressive stamp of 20 years of post-Cold War 
regional cooperation, there remains substantial varia-
tion in terms of key socio-economic and political fac-
tors at national and local levels. To what extent can 
‘lessons learned’ or common sets of best practices be 
generated across the Arctic when it comes to business-
society relations?
This brief article speaks to this growing trend in Arc-
tic business cooperation by bringing to light both com-
monality and variation in society-business relations. We 
examine how petroleum-related corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR) was understood in two Russian Arctic 
locations. Corporate social responsibility can be under-
stood as an ‘umbrella term’ (Frynas, 2009: 194), encom-
passing many activities a company performs in order to 
maintain a ‘social contract’ with stakeholder populations. 
What CSR means in practice—and, importantly, who 
is defined as a stakeholder—tends to vary highly across 
contexts and specific projects.
In the case of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (NAO) 
in the Russian Arctic, the perceptions presented are of 
fully realized petroleum projects and accompanying 
CSR projects, as there has been large-scale oil and gas 
production in the region for several decades. By con-
trast, Murmansk Oblast’—where the giant Shtokman 
gas project in the Barents was put on indefinite hold in 
2012 in the wake of high expectations—the analysis is 
necessarily more about petroleum anticipation and early 
CSR engagement. We draw upon 56 in-depth qualita-
tive interviews with a variety of actors (business, gov-
ernment, indigenous and environmental organizations 
and ‘everyday’ citizens) carried out in 2013 and 2014 (for 
the complete set of findings and methods, see Wilson 
Rowe, forthcoming and Loe, forthcoming). The inter-
views focused on eliciting interviewees’ expectations of 
petroleum companies’ CSR engagement, their general 
understanding of the term CSR, and their perception 
of quality of life changes in their region.
Murmansk and the Shtokman Project
The Kola Peninsula, with most of its territory north of 
the Arctic Circle, was among the targets for Soviet pio-
neering and the region grew massively from 23,000 res-
idents in 1927 to one million by the end of the Soviet 
period (for a detailed account see Rowe, 2013; num-
bers from Kiselev in Overland and Berg-Nordlie, p. 19). 
Much of the region’s development took place under Sta-
lin’s staggering “revolution from above”, involving an 
expansion of the industrial resource base that prompted 
the exploration and subsequent incorporation of the 
Soviet Arctic into the socialist production system (osvoe-
nie severa) (Josephson, 2014).
The possibility of petroleum development in the Bar-
ents Sea seemed to be ushering in a new chapter in the 
region’s economic geography. The Shtokman gas field, 
located in the Barents Sea some 600 km north of the 
shores of the Kola Peninsula, is one of the world’s largest 
natural gas fields. The prospect of developing the Shtok-
man field was first earnestly pursued in the early and 
mid-1990s. In 2005, cooperation agreements to develop 
this field were signed by Russia and Norway and Russia 
and France with Gazprom at the forefront. These agree-
ments triggered an avalanche of bids from other IOCs 
for field development (Claes and Moe, 2014).
What ensued could be described as a  ‘beauty pag-
eant’ (Overland, 2011) with companies seeking to pres-
ent their competence (including in CSR and local rela-
tions), financing and willingness to accept bargaining 
downwards on contract terms. Eventually, Statoil and 
Total joined a consortium with Gazprom called the 
Shtokman Development AG in 2008. However, explo-
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ration never got off the ground with the ‘shale revolu-
tion’ in the US driving gas prices down in what had 
been a target market for liquefied natural gas from the 
Shtokman field. The shareholder agreement expired in 
July 2012 and the costly and challenging nature of the 
project make Shtokman a daunting prospect for any 
company operating in today’s gas markets.
Perceptions of CSR
In contrast to the Nenets case presented below, the for-
mal translation of the term ‘corporate social responsi-
bility’ frequently elicited little response and interview-
ees were reluctant to engage with it. However, when 
rephrased into asking them to recount and assess the 
social and environmental engagement of companies 
more generally, all interviewees, including dentists and 
manicurists and others quite far from corridors of power 
and industry, had much to say. This finding suggests 
that information about large-scale economic develop-
ment does indeed circulate in Murmansk Oblast', infor-
mally, via social media and through more formal media 
and informational channels.
As interviewees were asked to consider whether 
the international parade of oil and gas companies 
involved in the Shtokman field had met their expec-
tations, many preferred to keep the focus on what 
one might call ‘Soviet CSR’, judging petroleum com-
panies’ involvement against the memories and cur-
rent practices of the major economic actors established 
in the region during the Soviet period. Interviewees 
warmly recited past and present benefits and services 
provided by the companies to their own employees—
entertainment and celebrations, travel, pensioner hous-
ing, specialized medical care, education and other fam-
ily benefits.
One interviewee from the NGO-sector put it this 
way, arguing that ‘Soviet CSR’ was much like what one 
could expect from a proper CSR policy today:
“I grew up in Monchegorsk [one of the mining 
towns] and as a kid knew who the director of 
the factory was, but not the head administrator 
of the town. There were good kindergartens and 
schools, organized trips and excursions to the fac-
tory. This was not called CSR then, but the form 
was the same even if the name was different.”
This quote suggests that one element of the social con-
tract between business and society in Russia is that it 
remains focused on the company’s relations to their 
own employees and their families and, within this rela-
tionship, expectations are quite high about what a com-
pany should provide.
Given the historically labour intensive aspects of 
mineral resource extraction and processing, this group 
of employees and families could be quite large and usu-
ally encompassed entire towns (Rowe, 2013). This focus 
on the employees of the company itself as the primary 
social and environmental stakeholders is a  feature of 
‘Soviet CSR’ that may be at odds with how interna-
tional oil companies define and understand stakeholder 
sets (where stakeholders can, for example, also be the 
regional public more generally and/or those specifically 
negatively impacted by development at any point in the 
production process).
There was nonetheless a general appreciation of, 
and ability to recollect, some of the flagship outreach 
efforts by Russian and international petroleum com-
panies new to the region. Some interviewees were able 
to list concrete initiatives that they felt companies had 
included as part of their social policies. For example, 
one interviewee noted that Rosneft has many social 
projects, like ‘Best Yard in Town’ and Total brings 
opera singers and ballet to town. Statoil loves cul-
tural projects too—exhibitions, Grieg music, while 
another recalled a  scholarship program, support of 
sporting events and excursions for residents of Teri-
berka (a village on the Murmansk coastline) as key 
CSR initiatives.
Many remained uncertain about the actual outcomes 
of CSR, wondering if it had been just PR or empty words 
to satisfy company policy. Over half of the interviewees 
emphasized a basic set of corporate citizenship princi-
ples, arguing that the best CSR was for companies to 
manage risk (environmental and social) properly, pro-
vide employment, follow legislation and pay their taxes. 
As with the Nenets case below, there was also an endur-
ing concern about inequality. For example, an ‘every-
day’ interviewee put it this way, ‘maybe the companies 
do a lot—they sure say a lot. But it gets lost somewhere 
up high’. Several interviewees expressed the suspicion 
that the oil and gas boom—even the one in their region 
that never came to fruition—had surely benefited some-
one, but not the general public.
NAO Case
The Nenets Autonomous Region (NAO) is geographi-
cally large, approximately half the size of Finland, but 
sparsely populated, with only about 43,000 inhabit-
ants. Nearly half the population lives in the regional 
capital, Naryan-Mar, while the rest is spread across the 
region, many living from traditional reindeer herding. 
The local population and regional authorities have sev-
eral decades of experience with relating to the oil and 
gas industry. Oil accounts for more than 90 per cent 
of the region s´ total industrial output, which provides 
NAO with the highest gross regional product per cap-
ita in Russian (GKS 2013).
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Perceptions of CSR
When asking about CSR, the Russian term “korpora-
tivnaya sotsial'naya otvetstvennost'” was used which, 
interestingly, was known to practically all respondents. 
Many interviewees re-phrased it, explaining that they 
used a similar term, but there was strong awareness of 
oil and gas companies’ responsibility to contribute to 
the well-being of the local population among all lay-
ers of the population. Like in Murmansk, “Soviet CSR” 
was referred to by several interviewees, of which some 
explained that the term “CSR” was nothing else than 
a foreign way of presenting something they had always 
had in Russia.
When asked about how CSR was carried out in prac-
tice, the dominating explanation was that it entailed 
three main components: Firstly, the oil companies pro-
vided funding to the regional authorities, who re-dis-
tributed the money to the benefit of the population, 
including social and cultural measures. Secondly, the 
companies paid for particular activities or “social objects” 
(schools, kindergartens, orphanages etc.) which the 
regional authorities had asked them to finance. Finally, 
there were projects initiated and organized by the oil 
companies themselves, including for example health and 
educational activities, and sponsoring festivals or other 
cultural events. Providing compensation for reindeer 
herders affected by oil and gas activities, following estab-
lished procedures, was also put forward as an important 
CSR component. The interviewees hence related CSR 
primarily to allocation of funding for uncontroversial 
so-called “micro-level” activities or projects, while prac-
tically no interviewees mentioned “macro-level” CSR, 
defined by Gulbrandsen and Moe (2007: 813) as “the 
responsibility of transnational companies for the broader 
economic, political, social and human development in 
host countries”.
A philanthropic perspective of CSR was apparent 
from several interviews. For example, a local oil company 
representative explained that CSR was what people did 
due to the “kindness of their soul”. Others talked about 
CSR as something the companies did voluntarily, addi-
tionally (dopolnitel'no) to what he law required.
Many interviewees emphasized the need to support 
the indigenous population more, especially those liv-
ing far away from the regional capital—where the liv-
ing standards were particularly low. In order to under-
stand their real needs, several respondents called for 
increased involvement and physical presence from the oil 
companies, which were encouraged to spend time talk-
ing to people where they live. At the same time, cooper-
ation and engagement with the regional authorities was 
described as essential and indispensable for companies 
aiming to respond to local needs through CSR measures.
While the majority of respondents welcomed CSR 
measures from the companies, there were also some criti-
cal voices—arguing that companies should do their busi-
ness, but leave the local population alone. One indige-
nous woman in a high position warned against a “beggar 
mentality” which easily occurred if there were opportu-
nities for asking economic support or other kinds of help 
from the oil companies. Others explained that when oil 
companies supported some groups, for example reindeer 
herder units directly affected by oil and gas activities, 
and not others, it easily created conflicts between peo-
ple who previously were on equal terms.
All in all, there was a broad span in what respon-
dents said about their understanding of CSR, what they 
thought about CSR practices they were familiar with 
locally, and what they personally thought CSR should 
encompass. No clear dividing line was apparent between 
responses from indigenous and non-indigenous people, 
nor between oil company representatives or regional 
authorities. While the number of interviews is too small 
to be representative, some patterns nevertheless appear to 
emerge from the conversations: The closer links respon-
dents had to the oil and gas companies or the regional 
authorities, the more positive attitudes they expressed. 
Several oil company representatives, representatives for 
the regional authorities and people who had received 
funding for projects, talked about NAO as a particu-
larly successful region, where relations between people 
were harmonious and mechanisms for conflict resolu-
tion were in place. “Ordinary”, and relatively poor peo-
ple, with no stakes in the benefits from oil and gas, were 
often far more critical of how the system worked, report-
ing that some oil company representatives treated them 
badly, and that there was a low degree of transparency 
in the spending of CSR-related funding.
One may perhaps talk about “insiders” and “out-
siders” to the system, where some, but not all, bene-
fit directly from oil and gas activity. The general atti-
tude towards petroleum activity in the region however 
appeared to be positive; only one of the respondents 
directly expressed opposition against oil and gas activ-
ities. The rest pointed either at benefits from oil and 
gas or encouraged improvement of the current system.
Concluding Thoughts
The Murmansk and NAO cases stand out as examples 
of the great regional variety found in the Russian Arctic, 
the first being a large industrial city where the expected 
oil and gas boom never happened, the second a sparsely 
populated region completely dominated by oil and gas 
activities. The Murmansk case is perhaps an outlier in 
the Russian context, where oil and gas projects do indeed 
continue to be developed in the Arctic, but perhaps more 
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indicative of a research agenda around the expectations 
and lessons learned from abandoned extractive industry 
projects that could be usefully pursued in Greenland, 
Canada and the USA.
In terms of CSR practice, companies and those who 
regulate them must remember that the experiences gen-
erated through a near century of Arctic industrializa-
tion in Russia will be important if and when interna-
tional companies further expand their involvement in 
Russia’s oil and gas development. For example, ‘Soviet 
CSR’ keeps the focus on a company’s relations to its 
own employees and their families and the local setting—
while meeting a general standard of tax and political loy-
alty to the region. This is in contrast to a CSR that tar-
gets a broader audience, such as the public as a whole 
or negatively impacted communities. Carrying out suc-
cessful CSR may entail both matching previous ‘positive’ 
local experiences while meeting international standards.
A lesson learned from the two case studies is hence 
that, when talking about petroleum-related CSR in the 
Arctic, a “one-size-fits-all” solution may not be appli-
cable, and that the local context must be taken into 
account. In order to achieve local acceptance or “licence 
to operate” oil companies operating in Russia need to 
establish a context and project-dependent dialogue and 
interaction with the regional authorities, as well as deal-
ing with the local population.
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ANALYSIS
Partnership or Dependency? Local Perceptions of the Petroleum Industry 
Ripple Effect in the Komi Republic
By Emma Wilson, London, and Daniel Fjaertoft, Oslo
Abstract:
Petroleum exploration and production can boost development in resource-rich regions. Yet revenue misuse, 
environmental neglect, or the crowding out of traditional industries may lead to disappointed local expec-
tations. Petroleum activity often increases employment, in the industry itself, in service and supply indus-
tries, and through multiplier effects from secondary industries and increased purchasing power. In some 
countries, employment and business opportunities dominate the discourse around promoting new oil and 
gas projects. In Russia, however, companies tend to highlight their social investment spending, such as sup-
port for kindergartens, sports arenas and cultural events. In this article we compare economic research find-
ings with ethnographic field results to understand how local people in Russia’s Komi Republic assess the 
direct and indirect economic effects of oil and gas projects and how these are weighed against environmen-
tal and social concerns.
Introduction
Like other oil-producing regions of the world, the Komi 
Republic has experienced both benefits and adverse 
effects of oil development. In urban centres such as 
Usinsk, petroleum activity contributes to employment 
and increased purchasing power. In rural areas, how-
ever, while there are some oil jobs, the population faces 
the effects of environmental neglect and limited eco-
nomic opportunities overall following a decline in tra-
ditional industries. As a result, there is distrust towards 
the petroleum industry and local authorities.
In other countries local job creation and business 
opportunities feature greatly in the discourse around 
promotion of new oil and gas projects. In Russia, how-
ever, companies tend to focus on their social investment1 
spending in their promotional material, highlighting 
projects such as kindergartens, clinics, youth competi-
tions, sports and cultural events.2 Fjaertoft (2015) sug-
gests this distinction relates to the lack of economic ben-
efits that accrue to local populations through jobs and 
multiplier effects; and while tax revenues are impor-
tant to the regional economy, the centralisation of tax 
collection at the federal level substantially reduces the 
regional benefits from taxation.
This article seeks to explore these points further, com-
bining economic and ethnographic analysis. The eco-
nomic analysis outlines the significance of the petroleum 
1 Social investment programmes are defined as the voluntary con-
tributions companies make to the communities and broader soci-
eties where they operate, with the objective of benefiting external 
stakeholders, typically through the transfer of skills or resources 
(IPIECA, 2008, p.2).
2 See for example the company websites of Gazprom (<http://
www.gazprom.ru/social/>) and Lukoil (<http://www.lukoil.com/
static_6_5id_263_.html>)
industry to the Komi Republic economy. We compare 
this with ethnographic field research to explore how local 
people perceive the local socio-economic effects of the 
industry. The economic analysis uses a purpose-made 
input-output model3 created to capture the petroleum 
industry’s economic significance at the levels of Russia 
and the Komi Republic (Fjaertoft, 2015). The ethno-
graphic fieldwork took place between 2013 and 2015 
in the north of the Komi Republic and includes 33 for-
mal and informal interviews with officials, industry, aca-
demics, and citizens of villages directly affected by the 
industry (see Wilson, 2015). The research is part of the 
project Sustainability and Petroleum Extraction, funded 
by the Norwegian Research Council.4
Oil in the Komi Republic
In the Komi Republic oil production is concentrated 
the northern districts, such as Usinsk District, where 
the industry was established in the 1960s. Usinsk suf-
fered one of the world’s largest oil spills in 1994, when 
the state-owned company Komineft spilled 100,000 
tonnes of oil across 72 square miles of tundra follow-
ing a pipeline leak.5 Komineft was bought by Lukoil 
in 1999, re-named Lukoil-Komi, and now dominates 
the region’s oil companies. In their 2006 Sustainability 
Report Lukoil reported that they had cleaned up the 
inherited consequences of 1994 (Lukoil, 2006). None-
theless, much of the ageing pipeline infrastructure still 
3  This technique maps the inputs needed by one sector of the econ-
omy from all the other sectors of the economy to produce one 
unit of output. When this mapping is completed for all sectors 
of the economy the input-output model reveals detailed quan-
tified inter-relations between all sectors in the economy
4  See <http://csroil.org/>
5  See <http://www1.american.edu/ted/komi.htm>
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needs replacing and continues to leak. The industry saw 
substantial growth in the early 2000s with oil produc-
tion increasing from 9 million tons in 2000 to 13.7 mil-
lion in 2012 (Staatesen, 2014). In addition to Lukoil-
Komi the region’s oil companies include Severnaya Neft' 
(Rosneft'), Rusvietpetro (a Russian–Vietnamese joint 
venture), and Kolvaneft' (Nobel Oil).
The town of Usinsk has visibly benefited from the 
oil wealth, with shopping malls, supermarkets and cafes. 
Usinsk’s citizens include many incomers from other 
Russian regions as well as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and 
Ukraine who came for oil and construction jobs. Res-
idents seem happy with the benefits brought by the oil 
industry, though some complain about the cost of liv-
ing, particularly housing.
The villages of Usinsk District lie on tributaries of 
the Pechora River and are predominantly populated 
by the Komi people who have traditionally engaged in 
fishing, reindeer herding and commerce. Agriculture 
thrived during the Soviet period, but has since declined 
in the face of market competition and reduced subsidies. 
Some people have set up small enterprises (e.g. in trade 
or construction), or work in the public sector. But still, 
the oil industry is one of very few significant employ-
ers in the district. Villagers engage actively in fishing, 
hunting and harvesting berries and mushrooms to sus-
tain their livelihoods. In contrast to city dwellers, they 
feel the direct negative effects of oil spills, as well as land 
disruption from oil-related exploration and construction.
Structure of Taxation Hampers Ripple 
Effects in Russian Regions
Russia’s petroleum sector is subject to a range of taxes, 
the most important being the federal mineral extrac-
tion tax (Diachkova, 2011). Petroleum production also 
generates income tax, profit tax and tax on dividends. 
Oil companies operating in the Komi Republic are pre-
dominantly major Russian companies incorporated in 
Moscow; and so profit tax is mainly levied there. The 
same is assumed to apply for taxes on dividends. Thus 
regional budgets only benefit from income tax, along 
with some minor land taxes. Moreover, many non-local 
workers are employed on oil projects, and much of the 
income tax is collected in workers’ home regions.
Comparing the economic effects of petroleum sec-
tor growth at the national and regional (Komi Repub-
lic) levels, Fjaertoft (2015) demonstrates that an equal 
relative increase in petroleum output leads to higher 
average sector growth at the national level. This find-
ing demonstrates the Komi economy’s lesser capacity 
to harness ripple effects from the petroleum industry. 
At the same time, because of the regional petroleum 
industry’s greater size relative to the regional economy, 
the same relative industry growth leads to greater over-
all economic growth (primarily through tax revenues) 
regionally than nationally, despite the limited capacity 
for tax collection regionally.
According to Fjaertoft’s (2015) input-output model, 
the petroleum sector accounts for 5% of total output 
at the national level and 15% in the Republic of Komi. 
Thus a 10% increase in petroleum output constitutes 
a roughly three times larger impact at the regional than 
national level, if measured relative to total economic out-
put. Had employment effects been equal at the national 
and regional levels, one would expect employment ben-
efits in Komi to be roughly three times larger than at 
the national level. Instead they are roughly equal under 
the most optimistic modeling assumption and lower 
when accounting for centralized petroleum tax collec-
tion, which deprives Russia’s oil-producing regions of 
an important ripple effect mechanism.
In sum, although the Komi Republic economy is 
highly dependent on the oil industry, it receives less 
benefit from increased regional oil production than the 
national economy does. Adverse effects such as oil spills, 
however, are a local affair. It appears that oil-producing 
regions in Russia are bearing a greater cost for increased 
oil production than the benefit they get in return, com-
pared to the nation as a whole.
Economic analysis suggests the lack of employment-
related ripple effects in public discourse such as oil indus-
try publicity materials may be explained by the relative 
insignificance of such benefits. But how do local people 
assess oil industry benefits and how do they weigh these 
against other social and environmental considerations? 
In the following section we consider what ethnographic 
analysis can tell us about the local discourse surround-
ing oil industry benefits in the northern Komi Republic.
Local Perceptions of Oil Industry Benefits
Local people are aware of the implications of Russia’s tax 
regime, and that they used to receive more tax before 
‘federalisation’. They are also aware that many oil workers 
pay their taxes in their home regions, while some com-
panies that are responsible for oil spills—such as Rusvi-
etpetro, responsible for a significant spill in 2013—are 
registered and pay their taxes elsewhere.
Villagers as well as townsfolk appreciate the positive 
benefits of the oil industry, including jobs and trade 
opportunities. There are good relations between rein-
deer herders and oil workers when they meet on the tun-
dra (e.g. exchanging fuel for reindeer meat). While the 
oil industry is sometimes blamed for the withdrawal of 
government support for other industries (notably agri-
culture), there is also acceptance that the days of large-
scale Soviet subsidies are gone and agriculture in north-
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ern Komi is much less viable in modern day market 
conditions.
There is, however, some resentment that northern 
Komi is not thriving as much as it should. Some vil-
lagers are still waiting to have gas piped to their village, 
something that was promised but not delivered. Others 
note the poor state of the roads or water supply. They 
complain of damage to fisheries from oil pollution. As 
one villager stated: ‘There have been no commercial 
fisheries since the 1994 spill.’ There has been damage 
to livestock (e.g. cows dying after consuming oil-cov-
ered grass, reindeer killed in road accidents). People have 
lost berry and mushroom picking grounds and hunting 
grounds to oil works.
In general people want the industry to stay, but say 
that companies need to work cleanly and respect local 
people. The biggest problem is the ageing pipelines—
they are being replaced, but not well enough or fast 
enough. People are angry at what they perceive to be 
environmental negligence and corruption. Companies 
often fail to report spills. Moreover, lack of land rights 
means lack of access to compensation, while the meth-
ods for calculating compensation are unclear. The vil-
lages that suffer the pollution do not receive anything 
from environmental fines: the money goes into the dis-
trict budget and is used for general purposes.
Social Investment Spending: Partnership or 
Dependency?
Given the lack of benefit from taxation, the scale of envi-
ronmental damage and the lack of compensation, it is 
unsurprising that companies’ social investment projects 
(or ‘social partnerships’) take on a greater significance 
in local people’s eyes. This includes support for educa-
tion and culture, sports events, youth competitions and 
community festivals; restoration of local churches, con-
struction of libraries, and support for war veterans and 
invalids. Innovative projects have included provision of 
satellite phones to reindeer herders and a zero-interest 
credit programme for local enterprises.
Yet people frequently express dissatisfaction with 
‘social partnership’ programmes. There is a perception 
that companies just want to generate positive publicity 
for themselves, especially after a spill; companies make 
promises when eliciting approval for starting work, and 
then fail to keep those promises.
Previously there were direct agreements between oil 
companies and the villages, but in 2009 the relation-
ship was taken over by Usinsk, as part of an overall cen-
tralization of power. People feel excluded from decision-
making as a result. The head of a local village council 
complained: ‘The administration of Usinsk depends on 
the oil companies to pay for pensions and so on. Then 
they tell us “we are paying your pensions” as an excuse 
for centralizing the relationship with the oil companies’.
People report that social investment spending is fre-
quently ineffective or misspent, with projects such as 
a cowshed or a water borehole poorly constructed or 
left unfinished. People complain of the lack of research 
that goes into deciding how to spend these funds, and 
a lack of public access to information and involvement 
in decision-making. They call for greater support for 
skills development, especially for young people, both for 
the oil industry itself and for other livelihood activities.
Concluding Remarks
Local residents of the Komi Republic’s oil-producing 
districts are aware of the lack of benefits that accrue to 
them through the taxation system, and this affects the 
way other benefits are viewed locally. This, and the lack 
of benefits through employment and multiplier effects, 
helps to explain the emphasis of Russian companies on 
reporting their social investment projects over other 
types of ripple effects. Below we suggest one or two 
ways to enhance local benefits.
First of all, the overriding priority for local people is 
for the oil industry to improve its environmental perfor-
mance. This means replacing ageing pipelines effectively 
and in a timely manner; sharing adequate information 
about spills with local populations; and engaging in mean-
ingful community engagement on environmental issues as 
well as benefit sharing. Engagement and partnership need 
to take place more directly with communities rather than 
focusing only on the relationship with officials in Usinsk.
To enhance benefit sharing we suggest a greater focus 
on building local skills both to work on oil projects and 
to support enterprise outside the industry. In the case 
of food production, the oil industry could also become 
a key customer. Experience worldwide has demonstrated 
how provision of low-interest credit and co-funding 
enhance local buy-in and project sustainability. This 
experience has been successful in the past in the Komi 
Republic and could be revisited. Decentralizing deci-
sion making to village-level committees could reduce 
dependency, increase local commitment and encourage 
local entrepreneurs to co-fund projects.
Transparency of decision-making on social invest-
ment spending is essential, with better research into 
local needs, open discussion of budget lines, and pub-
lication of how funds have been spent. This will help 
avoid perceptions of misspending and corruption. All of 
the above would strengthen the potential for retaining 
more of the benefits of the oil industry locally through 
sustainable and genuine social partnerships.
For information about the authors and references see 
overleaf
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